Showing posts with label Monopoly. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Monopoly. Show all posts

Monday, December 12, 2011

Deregulation of The Downstream Sector of the Nigerian Oil Industry (Part 3)


Feasibility | Contestability | Sustainability

Revenues from Nigeria's Oil resources has not
translated into substantial economic gains
Although the recent Occupy WallStreet is a major advocacy against corporate greed, the free market upon which this corporate organizations are built hold key values underpinning the modern economy. But we also need the government to play its own role in strengthening the operating environment thereby allowing a level playing ground for businesses. When some foreign firms make supernormal profits at the detriment of the common man, the common man is bound to revolt. Obviously, perfect market scenario create the efficient and welfare maximizing structure and behaviour for the common man particularly because allocative and technical cost considerations as well as pricing mechanisms are always favourable. Monopolists are not necessarily inefficient but our major concern is in terms of their pricing mechanism, their absolute freedom to set prices and the resultant supernormal profit is what raises concern. What we need to think about then is how do we ‘contest’ the monopoly powers in the downstream oil sector in Nigeria?

Contestability will ultimately result to Sustainability
A market is feasible (a usual condition for markets) when it clears (i.e. Total output=Total demand at price P) and firms that operate within the industry are not making negative profit.  More importantly a market is sustainable if above all it is feasible, no new entrant into the market can make profit (given incumbent price). If this is the case, it implies that marketers must set prices sufficiently low so much so that any further price reduction will lead to negative profit. But monopolist (especially the ones that operate in Nigerian oil market) will hardly ever bring their price that low. We can only attain an economically sustainable point in premium motor spirit (PMS/Petrol) and related product pricing when government encourages contestability rather than regulate (control-which brings about more corruption as will be discussed later) or renationalise (total government ownership- which is characterized by greater inefficiency, waste more corruption) is introduced. So let me stop making the term “contestability” a cliché, this is what it means in principle:
“A con-testable market is one into which entry is absolutely free, and exit is absolutely costless” Baumol (1982) [1] “The market price is independent of the number of firms currently serving a market because the mere possibility of entry suffices to discipline the actions of the supplier” (Browing and Zupan, 2009)
“The threat of entry is enough to cause the incumbent monopolist to price at the competitive level”
Let me demonstrate the idea with this diagram:
Click to enlarge
While the idea of contestability is very rare in real market scenario, it is a broader ideal which has a wider applicability based on the perfect market model and it is obviously an extension of Adam’s smith theory of the invisible hand.
This is what we advocate for in summary that government can promote sustainably low prices by encouraging contestability. As much as possible, government must ensure that barriers to new entrant into the oil market be removed. When the monopolist is contested, we can witness powerful optimal results: Prices will fall from Pm to Pc (see Diagram A), firms operate in a unique environment where zero profit is made; prices are equivalent to the average costs of the firm and best (second-best) pricing can be achieved. We also don’t need to regulate the industry as there will be a level playing ground for firms. No need for government to be involved. But we need to keep an eye on the fact that incumbent monopolists still have their way of erecting entry barrier upon which they still make their supernormal profit.

The Downside: Corruption
Just as I have always anticipated in previous posts that most of the figures available to us may be subject to inaccuracies, I am not at all surprised as a recent Sahara Report of the Ministry-of-Finance-aidedKPMG forensic report of the NNPC shows various levels of anomaly. We know that if government has truly been subsidizing as it claims our people should be better off; the hardship would not be this pronounced. it seem clear now that both the recent importers/marketers have questions to answer and the NNPC responsible for of paying the huge billions of subsidy money as well as handle all Nigeria’s oil transaction have develop mastery in diverting a portion of these money for personal benefit, leaving the masses struggling to meet their daily need. It’s a low blow for someone like me who claim Nigerian in overseas country when faced with such report of corruption.

The upside: Corruption will be dealt with
But we will not give up. As the global disparity become more pronounced - emerging economies becoming brighter (especially those in Africa) while the western world witness shortfalls (climaxed in the EU crisis and poverty spikes in the US) - we will continue to advocate for efficient optimal solutions for our dear country. We are optimistic that our nation is at a cross-road, where God fearing people have to take their stand in corporate and governmental arena. Not just Christians (many have failed us), we need sons and daughters of God who will not compromise God’s standard in their daily dealing. I believe you and I can bring that so much desired, long awaited change. But first, we must change ourselves. Now is the time for change.


Seun Oyeniran


[1] [‘freedom of entry’ is used carefully here. It does not mean that it is costless or easy, but that a new entrant suffers no disadvantage in terms of production technique or perceived product quality relative to the incumbent monopolist, and that potential entrants find it appropriate to evaluate the profitability of en-try in terms of the incumbent firms' pre-entry prices]
References
Smith, Adam (1977) [1776]. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. University Of Chicago Press
Baumol, W. J., (1982), Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, American Economic Review, Vol. 72 No. 1, pp. 1-15
Baumol, W. J., Bailey, E. E., and Wil-lig, R. D., (1977), ‘Weak Invisible Hand Theorems on the Sustainability of Multiproduct Natural Monopoly’, American Economic Review, 67, 350-65.
Browning, E. K.,  and  M. A. Zupan, (2009), Microeconomics: Theory and Applications, John Wiley & Sons Inc.


Saturday, November 19, 2011

Part 2: Deregulation of The Downstream Sector of the Nigerian Oil Industry


Inefficiency and Welfare loss
Nigeria: The welfare of the people needs attention
Building on the first post, it cannot be overemphasized that the demand for PMS and other related product (kerosene, diesel, etc) is very high (inelastic) and the supply of these relatively scarce commodities are low. So we are right to call these few (but foreign based) suppliers monopolists since we assume them to be collectively categorized under the same industry. The monopolist import fuel into Nigeria and sells at the price it fixes by itself. If we look at Diagram A, it becomes clear that the monopolist charging prices at Po results in allocative inefficiency since consumer welfare is loss of the range QoQ1. Another issue is that these foreign based producers will not ensure lowest cost in their production (i.e. it will not produce at its lowest average cost. See Diagram A). It is therefore productively (or technically) inefficient. A monopolistic market mechanism is an imperfect one especially in the Nigerian situation. The affordability range of the common man is improved when prices of petrol come down. And this is where government needs to come in, but should it be through subsidy?
If the data available at PPPRA is correct (sincerely), then there is truly regulation and government involvement; the Diagram B shows the obvious disparity in what is supposed to be the price of petrol to what is obtainable at retail or filling station. What we are supposed to pay is N139.69 but we are currently paying N65 because government has subsidized the actual cost. If the billions of naira subsidy is truly paid as we are being told, the masses are being helped and removal (diversion as some stakeholders claim) of these subsidy will lead to unprecedented hardship for the masses. But applying subsidy itself is not an efficient solution, it comes with problems.
Governmentization Problems
while it is still very difficult for us to verify data,  if governmentization (a word I coined for government + subsidization) is actually applied as we have in other parts of the world (in order to regulate the industry), then it will surely come with certain problems. The first problem is that government lack enough information about the industry and particularly about the production outlay of foreign firms. Paying for subsidy on very poor information of the industry is tantamount to waste of resources and money. Additionally, it may be difficult for government to also quantify these products since they government may not be directly involved in quantity estimation. It may be useful to note also that the time to apply subsidy may have been wrong from the beginning. Subsidy implementation administrative cost may result in overall higher cost. The final and most important problem with subsidy is that most of government involvement in issues like these is politically motivated and the economic rationality may not be fully considered. Although it may look like it benefits the people, maybe an arrangement is been made between the government and a particular foreign oil firm (?)

More Key Issues
If we must always use petrol and related product, we need to demand for lower prices. There must be a way for us to get these products at a cheaper price. If prices must then fall from what we have now, we need to look more into the supply side economics. Governmentization may be a feasible option but it does not look like a sustainable one. Subsidy comes with its own problems as explained above and so may not result in a pareto optimal solution. Since what will result in a continuous price reduction will emanate from reducing production cost and increasing efficiency (allocative and technical), it will be logical for us to think first of revamping Nigeria’s refineries. We can then ensure that those firms that import or sell to Nigeria from abroad establish local refinery in Nigeria. This will not only reduce their overhead costs, it will lead to increasing FDI flows into Nigeria. I have mentioned earlier on this blog that, although it may come with risks, companies that invest in new, unfamiliar or difficult terrain like Nigeria will be quick to reap the revenue because they will build economies of scale, increase in their experience curve and enjoy the ever buoyant domestic demand potentials that Nigeria possess. The result of this is increased infrastructure and competition. We will tie everything together in the economic theory of contestability which I will discuss briefly later.

Seun Oyeniran


References
Beesley, M. E., and Littlechild, S. C., (1989), ‘The regulation of privatised monopolies in the United Kingdom’, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 20 No. 3, pp. 454-72.
Borcherding, T. E., Pommerehne, W. W., and Schneider, F., (1982),‘Comparing the Efficiency of Private and Public Production: A Survey of the Evidence from Five Federal States.’, Journal of Economic Theory, Public Production, Suppl. 2 pp. 127-56.
Ehrlich, I., Gallais-Hamonno, G., Liu, Z., and LutterSource, R., (1994), ‘Productivity Growth and Firm Ownership: An Analytical and Empirical Investigation’, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 5, pp. 1006-1038.
Quiggin, J., (2002), ‘Privatisation and nationalisation in the 21st century’, Growth 50, 66–73.
Grossman, G.M., and Helpman, E. (1994), Endogenous Innovation in the Theory of Growth, Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, No. 1, pp. 23-24.
Ehrlich, I., Gallais-Hamonno, G., Liu, Z., and LutterSource, R., (1994), ‘Productivity Growth and Firm Ownership: An Analytical and Empirical Investigation’, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 5, pp. 1006-1038.
Lewis, W.W., (2004), The Power of Productivity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Porter M.E., (1990), “The Competitive Advantage of Nations”, Harvard Business Review
The Economist (2010), Businesses will learn to look beyond the BRICs, Nov 22nd 2010 | from The World In 2011 print edition (http://www.economist.com/node/17493411?story_id=17493411)
Hill, C.W.L., (2011), International Business: Competing in the Global Market Place, New York: Mc Graw-Hill
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2010 , accessed 3/3/2011
Human Development Report 2010, The Real Wealth of Nations:Pathways to Human Development, UNDP 2010, accessed 3/3/2011
Saugato Datta, (2011) (Eds), Economics: Making Sense of the Modern Economy, London: Profile Books